From P.S. v. R.S., determined Wednesday by the Indiana Courtroom of Appeals, in an opinion by Choose L. Mark Bailey, joined by Judges Terry A. Crone and Rudolph R. Pyle III; for readability, I am going to describe “R.S.” as Pupil (which he was on the time the criticism started) and “P.S.” as Critic:
At the start of his sophomore yr in highschool, [Student] created a video of himself “spelling … out a racist slur.” The video surfaced on social media throughout [Student]’s senior yr in highschool, and the video continues to flow into on social media.
[Critic], a involved citizen, noticed the video and started commenting about it and [Student] on her publicly accessible social media web page. [Critic] “ke[pt] posting and reposting adverse issues towards [Student,] … and … calling him out by his title as nicely.” And [Critic] and different residents appeared on the native college board assembly to “attempt[ ] to get some sort of disciplinary” motion imposed. [Student]’s father (“Father”) contacted [Critic] and requested her to take away the video from her social media feed in order that Father might “maintain [disciplining his son] in-house.” [Critic] complied with Father’s request however “then [the video] got here again quite a few instances [and] different folks began sharing it.”
On Could 3, 2023, [Student] filed a petition for a safety order towards [Critic], alleging that [Critic] had used social media to stalk [Student], slander him, and disseminate false info…. [Student] testified that in making the video, he made a “dumb, silly mistake” three years in the past that had been circulating on social media for the “previous seven [ ] months[,] and [Critic] has been slandering my title.” Father instructed the trial court docket that the “solely factor [Father and [Student]’s mom] have requested for from day one [is to] allow us to maintain our son, … however once more, … [Critic] appears to maintain … posting and reposting adverse issues towards him.”
[Critic] testified that she by no means contacted [Student] or his household, and that she “[d]idn’t know the place they lived, did not know something.” [Critic] additional testified that she didn’t “have any curiosity in concentrating on [Student on social media],” however that she believed it essential to proceed to touch upon the matter. She instructed the court docket that in her future social media posts, she would “most likely” “touch upon” [Student] and some other people who had been concerned with the video incident.
After listening to the testimony, the trial court docket denied [Student]’s petition for a safety order, ruling that “there’s not grounds” to grant it. The court docket then sua sponte imposed what it termed a “mutual restraining order” on each events, prohibiting them from—amongst different actions—speaking, harassing, or threatening one another straight or not directly, together with on social media. Particularly, the trial court docket instructed the events as follows:
THE COURT: Alright, so here is what I’m going to do. I’m going to order each of you to to not [sic] talk, to not harass, to not threaten one another in anyway [sic] form or kind, individually, straight, or by means of third … events or any type of social media. And I am not granting the Protecting Order, that is denied cuz [sic] there’s not grounds for a Protecting Order. However I’m granting a mutual restraining order so the 2 … of you permit one another alone. And if there’s issues that should be addressed ah, so far as involvement and the varsity company or contacting regulation enforcement or amongst your mates that is completely positive. However, clearly there’s been months of forwards and backwards on social media the place adverse issues had been stated on either side and it is each of you simply should be adults and there is no cause for it. So do you perceive ma’am? …
The appellate court docket concluded that the trial court docket lacked the authority underneath Indiana regulation to simply problem the order by itself, with out the events’ requesting it. The appellate court docket additionally concluded that the trial court docket’s order did not adjust to the “particular necessities apply for each restraining order granted with out discover,” together with “defining the damage, stating why it’s irreparable, … stating why the order was granted with out discover,” and having the order final not more than a quick time earlier than a full listening to. As a result of the appellate court docket reversed the order on these procedural grounds, it did not have to resolve whether or not the order violated the First Modification.
Stevie J. Pactor and Kenneth J. Falk of the ACLU of Indiana represented Critic.