A federal district court docket in Texas has concluded that the Division of Transportation (DOT) exceeded its statutory authority when it adopted a rule establishing a greenhouse fuel (GHG) efficiency measure for federally funded highways. Underneath the rule, states had been required to measure highway-related greenhouse fuel emission, set targets for GHG emission reductions, and observe progress towards such targets. The state of Texas objected to the rule and filed go well with.
This rule has a protracted historical past. The DOT first adopted a GHG efficiency measure for highways in 2016, on the finish of the Obama Administration. The Trump Administration rescinded this rule in 2018, concluding the DOT lacked authority to undertake a GHG-based efficiency measure underneath the related statute and was unhealthy coverage. After President Biden took workplace, the DOT reversed course once more, proposing a revised GHG freeway efficiency measure in 2022 and finalizing the rule in 2023.
As soon as the rule was promulgated, Texas promptly filed go well with, arguing that the rule exceeded the scope of DOT’s statutory authority, is unfair and capricious, and violates the federal authorities’s spending energy. Final month, Choose Wesley Hendrix sided with Texas, solely on statutory interpretation grounds.
Choose Hendrix summarizes his opinion in Texas v. USDOT as follows:
A federal administrative company can’t act with out congressional authorization. Right here, the Federal Freeway Administration created a rule requiring the states to measure, report, and set declining targets for the quantity of carbon dioxide emitted by automobiles utilizing the interstate and national-highway techniques. For authority, the company relied on 23 U.S.C. § 150(c)(3), which allows it to create measures to evaluate pavement situations, bridge situations, and “the efficiency of the Interstate System . . . [and] the Nationwide Freeway System.” Texas sued, alleging that the company lacked authority to enact the rule. Given the statutory textual content’s plain language and context, the Courtroom agrees. The related definitions and associated efficiency measures clarify that “efficiency of the Interstate/Nationwide Freeway Techniques” focuses on the infrastructure’s effectiveness in facilitating journey, commerce, and nationwide protection—not environmental outputs of automobiles utilizing the techniques. Furthermore, the DOT’s expansive interpretation is undermined by the truth that adopting it could render different statutory provisions superfluous. Moreover, Part 150(c)(3)’s efficiency measures solely exist to hold out Part 119’s Nationwide Freeway Efficiency Program, which additionally distinguishes between the freeway system’s efficiency and environmental affect. Thus, the Courtroom concludes that the rule was unauthorized.
Whereas Texas sought to buttress its arguments with the Main Questions Doctrine, the court docket noticed no have to do something greater than conduct a standard statutory evaluation, albeit one which depends upon the foundational premise that businesses solely have that authority affirmatively delegate to them (a premise I’ve inspired; e.g. right here and right here). As Choose Hendrix defined in a footnote: “as a result of the statutory language itself makes clear that the DOT lacked authorization to promulgate the 2023 Rule, the Courtroom needn’t resolve whether or not the difficulty introduced constitutes a ‘main query.'”
Texas additionally argued that insofar because the Division of Transportation sought to impose unrelated situations on the receipt of freeway cash, it may increase constitutional considerations (a problem I mentioned in this text with Nathaniel Stewart), however once more Choose Hendrix noticed want to achieve that subject.
Choose Hendrix additionally ordered a nationwide vacatur of the Division of Transportation’s rule, as he was required to due underneath Fifth Circuit precedent. As I’ve famous earlier than, I believe that is an improper studying of the Administrative Process Act, however Fifth Circuit precedent is extra binding on a federal district court docket in Texas than is my opinion. Reasonably than saying something about how the Division of Transportation ought to act elsewhere, Choose Hendrix ought to have merely held that the DOT’s regulation is unenforceable in opposition to Texas and permit DOT to find out whether or not it needs to acquiesce elsewhere.
I assume DOT will attraction.